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Abstract
String theory has not even come close to a complete formulation
after half a century of intense research. On the other hand, a number
of features of the theory suggest that the theory, once completed, may
be a final theory. It is argued in this chapter that those two conspic-
uous characteristics of string physics are related to each other. What
links them together is the fact that string theory has no dimensionless
free parameters at a fundamental level. The paper analyses possible
implications of this situation for the long term prospects of theory
building in fundamental physics.
1 Introduction
The present chapter aims at understanding the relation between two remark-
able characteristics of string physics. On the one hand, the theory’s position
within the fabric of physical reasoning as well as some characteristics of the
theory itself suggest that string theory, or the theory it would have morphed
into once fully developed, might represent a final theory : no empirical data
can be gathered in this world that would be at variance with the theory’s pre-
dictions. On the other hand, half a century of intense work on string theory
have not resulted in a fully fledged theory. At this point, the prospects that
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this will happen in the foreseeable future seem, if anything, less promising
than at earlier stages of the theory’s evolution.
Each of the described characteristics of string physics raises distinct and
substantial philosophical questions. A final theory claim raises the question:
what would the research process in fundamental physics look like once a uni-
versal final theory has been found? A natural question regarding the chronic
incompleteness of string theory is: why is it so difficult to develop string the-
ory into a fully fledged theory? The two questions might actually address two
sides of the same medal. They could then be posed in the following more spe-
cific way. Are the seemingly insurmountable difficulties to turn string theory
into a complete theory conceptually related to its character as a (potential)
final theory? Should we therefore understand chronic incompleteness as a
core characteristic of a final physical theory?
Dawid (2006, 2013, 2013a) has suggested that string theory may repre-
sent a fundamentally new stage in physical theory building, where theory
succession is replaced as the driving principle of conceptual development by
the open-ended evolution of the conceptual understanding of a final theory
that lacks a time frame for completion. If so, the advent of the final the-
ory prospect would have changed the mode of scientific reasoning without
abandoning the ‘infinite’ time horizon associated with the completion of fun-
damental physics.
This suggestion was based on two simple observations. i) Chroncical
incompleteness and the final theory claim have arisen in parallel in string
physics. ii) They seem to reflect generic features of quantum gravity. With-
out any specific reference to string theory, the current perspective on quan-
tum gravity may be taken to suggest that the notion of an ongoing succession
of theories for ever smaller characteristic distance scales will break down at
the Planck scale (see e.g. t’Hooft 1993). Likewise, the chronic problems of
attempts to come up with a complete theory of quantum gravity are not
confined to the string theory research program.
Dawid (2006, 2013, 2013a) has not put forward any substantial claim,
however, as to how the connection between the final theory status and the
chronic incompleteness of string theory can be understood at a conceptual
level. It is the aim of the present chapter to address this issue and consider
some lines of reasoning that may throw more light on the conceptual con-
nection between final theory status and chronic incompleteness. First, I will
analyse the ways in which chronic incompleteness may affect our understand-
ing of what a final theory actually amounts to. Second, a highly tentative
idea shall be considered as to how finality may be conceptually linked to
what seems to be the the predicament of chronic incompleteness faced by
physicists working on a universal theory.
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What follows is of an explorative nature. It will not present strong con-
clusions but just test possible ways of thinking about the issues discussed. I
do feel however, that those issues are so crucial for understanding the current
state of fundamental physics that they should be addressed also from a philo-
sophical perspective, and be it with the highly insufficient means available
to the author of this text.
Section 2 lists several ways in which string theory differs from previous
stages in fundamental physics. The issues of finality and chronic incomplete-
ness are then discussed specifically in Sections 3 and 4, and related to each
other in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 discusses the role of dualities in the given
context, followed by a brief look at the case of M-theory in Section 8.
2 Five ways in which string physics dif-
fers from previous stages in fundamental
physics
In the 19th century, when physical formalization found an ever increasing
scope of applications, a canonical understanding of the relation between the
observed world and physical theory building emerged. This understanding
was based on some core principles. Three of those principles that will be
important to our discussion, were:
I. A physical theory must be applied to a specified set of phenomena.
II. A theory can be adapted to observations by choosing values of dimen-
sionless parameters that either are contained in the theory itself or specify
the embedding of the given theory within the physical background needed
for understanding the measurements of the described set of phenomena.
III. Once one has identified a physical context that allows for a formalized
account, theories (which might well be insufficient or only partly accurate,
to be sure) can be developed (and most often also empirically tested) within
a limited time frame.
When the basic principles of classical physics were toppled during the
physical revolutions of the early decades of the 20th century, this understand-
ing of the role a physical theory was expected to play was complemented by
two further principles:
IV. A physical theory must be expected to have a limited lifetime as a
fundamental theory and to be eventually superseded by a new theory with
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regard to which it then plays the role of an effective theory.
V. Advanced physical theories contradict intuitions that are based on ev-
eryday world experience and contain parameters that control the deviations
from those intuitions. However, theories that are at variance with intuitions
make predictions in line with those intuitions in some limits: special rela-
tivity converges towards Galilean physics for velocities very small compared
to the speed of light, general relativity approaches predictions of Newtonian
gravity in contexts of very small spacetime curvature, and quantum mechan-
ics is consistent with the classical dynamics of objects who interact with the
environment and whose action is much larger than ~.
It seems fair to say that principles I - V shape many physicists’ expec-
tations regarding the role of physical theory building up to this day. While
these principles still work very well in many fields of physics, they came un-
der pressure in fundamental physics once fundamental physics developed a
focus on contemplating theories of quantum gravity. This pressure can be
felt today whichever approach towards dealing with the problem of quan-
tum gravity is chosen. The present text focuses on string theory, where the
inadequacy of the traditional view on physical theory looks particularly far-
reaching. In fact, string theory seems flatly incompatible with four of the
five principles formulated above and makes an intriguing amendment to the
fifth. As opposed to principles I.-V., one may make the following statements
about string theory1
I’. String theory is a universal theory.
II’. String theory has no fundamental dimensionless free parameters (but
seems to have a huge number of groundstates).
III’. String theory is chronically incomplete (and lacks a promising per-
spective for quantitative empirical testing in the foreseeable future).
IV’. String theory makes a final theory claim based on a minimal length
scale.
V’. String theory has several classical limits related to each other by
duality relations.
Given that the five described significant shifts with regard to the role of
theory building arise in the same theory, it seems natural to suspect that
they are somewhat related to each other. In the following, I will aim to turn
1Here as throughout the entire paper, the term ‘string theory’, if not specified otherwise,
denotes the overall theory that aims at descibing the observed world and is identified by
the present knowledge on perturbative superstring theory, duality relations, etc.
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that suspicion into something slightly more concrete.
3 Finality
A plausible starting point for finding connections between the five statements
on string theory is point IV’. T-duality implies that the string scale amounts
to a minimal length scale in string theory. Any statement on a distance
smaller than the string scale can be formulated, in the T-dual picture, as a
statement about a distance larger than the string length l. This fact may be
taken to indicate that string theory, if viable2 up to its own characteristic
scale, correctly represents physics at all scales and therefore constitutes a
final theory (Witten 1996).
A final theory claim that is extracted from a specific theory may be
suspected to be begging the question. If string theory were viable only as
an effective theory of a more fundamental theory, smaller distance scales
could carry new information based on that more fundamental theory. If
so, the more fundamental theory would break the final theory claim that
had been developed based on what turned out to be its effective theory.
A final theory claim based on the allegedly final theory’s own implications
therefore may seem to deflate to the trivial claim: if the theory is absolutely
true, it is actually absolutely true. Dawid (2013, 2013a) argues that, despite
the described issue, final theory claims can retain argumentative power in
conjunction with arguments of limitations to scientific underdetermination.
In the present discussion, we will therefore assume that the final theory
claim stated in point IV’, though obviously not conclusive, does carry argu-
mentative weight. If so, points I’ and II’ and IV’ form a remarkable set of
characteristics of string theory that suggest finality. Universality (point I’)
removes the need for theory succession on the path to further unification and
thereby frames string theory as a plausible endpoint of theory succession.
The lack of fundamental dimensionless free parameters (point II’) removes
the need for theory succession on the path towards explaining specific pa-
rameter values (since all effective parameter values must result from the dy-
namics of the full theory, where no parameter values can be chosen at will)
and thereby reinforces the former claim. Finally, the explicit final theory
2Throughout this chapter, I will talk about a theory’s viability rather than its truth.
A theory is viable in a given regime (e.g. up to a given energy scale), if it is in agreement
with all the data than can be collected in that regime (e.g. up to that energy scale).
Talking about a theory’s truth raises difficult philosophical questions that are not relevant
to the issues addressed in this chapter. A more extensive argument in favor of the concept
of viability can be found in Dawid (forthcoming).
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claim (point IV’) provides a conceptual reason within the theory’s theoret-
ical framework for assuming the finality of string theory. In conjunction,
the three points form a consistent and mutually reinforcing set of arguments
for string theory’s status as a final theory. Viewing the issue the opposite
way, Points I’, II’ and IV’ are per se highly unusual properties that may be
expected to arise in conjunction in a final theory.
4 Chronic Incompleteness
If it were just for the three discussed new aspects of string theory, one
would thus face the stunning perspective of an imminent end of fundamental
physics: once the final theory would have been fully formulated, no new fun-
damental theories should be expected to emerge. Physics would be reduced
to the menial work of developing theories in more specific low energy contexts
and understanding their reductive connections to string theory.
String theory comes with another substantial shift, however, that renders
the above understanding inadequate. 50 years after the birth of string theory
(Veneziano 1968) and 44 years after string theory has been first proposed as
a universal theory of all interactions (Scherk and Schwarz 1974), the theory
still lacks a plausible perspective for a full formulation in the foreseeable
future. The theory has known periods of considerable optimism. At least
twice during its evolution, in the years after the consistency of a superstring
action had been shown by Green and Schwarz (1984), and in the years after
the discovery of the web of dualities (Witten 1995, Townsend 1995, Polchinski
1996) and AdS/CFT correspondence (Maldacena 1998), string theorists were
hopeful that a full formulation of the theory was attainable by developing
further and making full use of the concepts and tools available at the time.
But each time overwhelming obstacles to achieving that goal soon surfaced as
if they were put up by magic hands defending the ultimate secrets of physics.
The problems associated with completing string theory in each case turned
out to transcend what string theorists at the given point had taken them to
be.
Today it seems clear that, even if the final theory claim regarding string
theory were true, this fact would not translate into a prospect of the imminent
end of fundamental physics. Rather than bringing the time horizon for the
completion of fundamental physics from virtual infinity to somewhere within
our lifetime, string theory’s final theory claim seems to be associated with
an extension of the time horizon for the completion of this particular theory
that may, once again, virtually reach towards infinity.
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5 Chronic Incompleteness and the Lack of
Free Parameters
Why is it so immensely difficult to turn string theory into a complete the-
ory? One important reason arguably has to do with one of the three points
associated with string theory’s finality claim: point II’, which states the the
lack of dimensionless free parameters at a fundamental level, creates a new
kind of problem for a theory’s completion.
In order to get a better grasp of this point, one needs to start with a look
at perturbation theory.
In QFT, which is understood to be the theoretical framework for calcu-
lating low energy effective theories of string theory, calculations of scattering
processes are based on a perturbative expansion in the coupling constant.
Small coupling constants allow for increasingly accurate results of calcula-
tions up to a few orders in perturbation theory.
It is one important aspect of quantum field theory that the strong coupling
regime is directly related to the deep quantum regime (see e.g. Polchinski
2017). Higher orders in the coupling constants correspond to higher orders
in ~. A weak coupling limit therefore corresponds to a small ~ limit and
represents a physical situation where elementary objects can be localized
fairly well. Physics then is in a near-classical regime.
Quantum mechanics frames measurements in terms of confronting a quan-
tum system with a quasi-classical measuring apparatus. The entire setup of
a quantum theory is therefore developed from the perspective of a classical
limit.
As long as the theory is in a regime where the coupling constant is small,
perturbation theory works. Once one aims to describe a strong coupling
regime, perturbation theory breaks down and one needs to rely on non-
perturbative methods and auxiliary techniques such as lattice theory. Such
a situation corresponds to a fully quantum regime where elementary objects
are not well localized.
In the standard model of particle physics, the electroweak sector lives in
a weak coupling regime and therefore allows for perturbative calculations.
QCD, at low energies, to the contrary, is strongly coupled and requires non-
perturbative techniques.
String theory has been developed based on perturbation theory in the
same mold as perturbation theory for QFT. It describes the propagation and
scattering of oscillating quantum strings on a spatiotemporal background. It
is clear, however, that this is an insufficient approach for spelling out the
full theory. The spatiotemporal background is itself generated by stringy
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dynamics. And string theoretical scenarios may be placed in either strong or
weak coupling regimes. In other words, it is clear that a full understanding
of string theory must reach out beyond the perturbative regime.
Duality relations constitute the most powerful tools in a string theoret-
ical context to reach out beyond the perturbative regime. The power of
dualities was first clearly understood in the mid 1990s, when Witten (1995)
conjectured that the five types of superstring theory plus a sixth enigmatic
11-dimensional M-theory were related to each other by S- and T-duality re-
lations that turned them into one different representation of the same theory.
Exact dualities relate different theories or models to each other that are
empirically equivalent.3 The isomorphy between the dual models is estab-
lished based on a ‘translation manual’ that indicates which parameters in
one theory correspond to which parameters in the dual theory and how the
values of those parameters in one theory are related to the values of the dual
parameter in the dual model.
Duality transformations are particularily helpful for reaching out towards
the non-perturbative regime because they tend to invert parameter values
and thereby relate one theory in a deep quantum regime to another one in
a near classical regime. S-duality relates a theory with a strong string cou-
pling g to a theory with a weak string coupling 1/g. T-duality relates a
theory with small compactification radius r to a theory with a large com-
pactification radius 1/r. In supersting theory, different types of superstring
theory are connected that way. For example, S-duality relates Type I super-
string theory with a given string coupling g to SO(32) heterotic string theory
with string coupling 1/g, which in turn has as its T-dual E8xE8 heterotic
string theory with an inverted compactified dimension. A strongly coupled
type I string theory can therefore be represented as a weakly coupled SO(32)
heterotic string theory. And if that theory contains a small compact dimen-
sion, it can be represented as a E8xE8 heterotic string theory with a large
compactification radius. The web of dualities therefore extends the reach of
string theory by establishing that large parts of what seemed to lie beyond
the reach of perturbation theory is accessible by perturbation theory in a
dual representation.
But string theory faces a problem that is substantially more serious than
the problem faced by a strongly coupled gauge theory. The additional prob-
lem is related to the fact that string theory is a theory without fundamental
dimensionless free parameters.
3The analysis of this chapter is based on the understanding that duality relations are
exact. Recently, the possibility of an inexact notion of dualities has been emphasised in a
philosophical context by De Haro (2018).
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In physics, it is important to distinguish between dimensionful and di-
mensionless parameters.4 The absolute value of a dimensionful parameter
is a matter of choosing a physical unit. Per se, it is irrelevant for fitting
theory to experiment. The value of a dimensionless parameter, to the con-
trary, cannot be altered by choosing different physical units. It therefore
tells something significant about our set of observations (if fixed based on
empirical data) or about a theory’s empirical implications (if extracted from
the theory itself). Physical theories normally involve dimensionless free pa-
rameters that can be tuned in order to fit the quantitative specifics of the
empirical evidence. In many cases, for example in quantum theories that
involve dimensionless coupling constants, dimensionless free parameters are
an element of the theory itself. In other cases, for example in Newtonian
gravity, the theory’s embedding within our observed world requires a com-
parison of a dimensionful constant (such as the gravitational constant) with
constants that characterize the empirical setup used to test that theory. Free
dimensionless parameters then arise in the context of this comparison. In
both cases, the free parameters involved play a crucial role for connecting
the theory to observation.
String theory is a fully universal theory that gives a joint description
of all fundamental phenomena. Measuring a fully universal theory cannot
depend on paramater values that are not represented in the theory itself.
Dimensionless free parameters thus cannot be generated by embedding a
fully universal theory in a wider framework. The issue of free dimensionless
parameters is reduced to internal characteristics of the theory itself.
String theory has one dimensionful free parameter, the string length l.
But the theory has no dimensionless free parameter. In the context of pertur-
bative string theory, this fact can be understood by looking at the geometric
structure of Feynman diagrams. While Feynman diagrams for pointlike parti-
cles have pointlike interaction nodes where dimensionless coupling constants
can be inserted, the corresponding stringy Feynman diagram is represented
by a two dimensional surface with non-trivial topology. No coupling con-
stants can be inserted at any point in those diagrams. The string coupling
enters as the value of an oszillation mode of the string, the dilaton.
The lack of dimensionless free parameters in string theory is crucial for
our analysis because dimensionless free parameters play an important role in
the specification of classical limits. Describing a near-classical limit in QFT
corresponds to choosing a small value of a dimensionless coupling constant.
Describing a small curvature scenario corresponds to choosing a small value
of the ratio between the characteristic length scale of the dynamics described
4(For an instructive analysis of the role of free parameters in physics, see Duff 2015.)
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and the radius of spacetime curvature. In the case of theories that involve
free parameters, placing the theory close to or far from a classical limit can
be controlled by choosing a value of a free dimensionless paramter. In string
theory, nothing of this sort can be done. The fundamental dynamics of
string theory therefore cannot be exempified by choosing a near-classical
limit. Whether or not the theory has solutions that lie close to a classical
limit is decided by the fundamental dynamics itself.
To be sure, parameter values such as the string coupling, the radii of com-
pact dimensions or background curvature terms can be specified in effective
models that emerge from the theory’s fundamental dynamics and correspond
to a ground state of the theory. Those effective parameter values can then
be close to or far from a classical limit. Calculating the fundamental dynam-
ics itself, however, cannot rely on specifying a parameter value that controls
whether physics is in a near classical or in a deep quantum regime. Only
once effective parameter values have been extracted as a solution of the fun-
damental dynamics, does the categorization in terms of near classical or deep
quantum make sense. Curvature terms, compactification radii or string cou-
pling constants can only be specified in the ground state of the theory once
the fundamental dynamics of the theory has already played out.
String theory thus finds itself in the following peculiar situation. It is de-
fined, as it stands, at a perturbative level in terms of strings moving through
background space. The core parameters that characterise the theory’s state
are spatio-temporal and allow for calculations in a near classical limit where
interaction is weak, objects are localized and curvature is low. The propaga-
tion of individual strings only amounts to a plausible intuitive representation
of the dynamics in a near classical limit. But the fundamental theory, lack-
ing dimensionless free parameters, cannot be related to any such limit before
calculation.
Framing the theory in terms of parameters that are selected in order to
work well in the near classical limit therefore looks like an awkward choice
when it comes to describing and calculating string theory’s fundamental dy-
namics. Still, all physical parameters deployed for describing string theory
or any other physical theory are of that kind (with one possible exception we
will return to a little later). These parameters seem capable of determining
some contours of the fundamental theory with the help of duality arguments
and consistency requirements. But they have not proved capable of providing
a workable basis for calculating the theory’s fundamental dynamics.
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6 Finality in the face of chronic incomplete-
ness
Let us, for the moment, presume that string theory is a final theory in the
sense that i) there is a string theory ground state that fully represents phe-
nomenology at energies below the Planck scale and ii) no observation that
can be made in principle would lead to the rejection of string theory. If string
theory is a final theory in this sense, the pair of facts stated at the end of
the previous paragraph may have at least three possible explanations.
A. Even in principle, there exists no mathematical scheme that is em-
pirically equivalent to string theory and generates quantitative results that
specify the fundamental dynamics of the theory. In that case, the funda-
mental theory is conceptually incomplete by its very nature. It has no fun-
damental dynamics and no set of solutions that can be deduced from its
first principles. The fundamental theory merely serves as a conceptual shell
that embeds low energy descriptions (ground states of the theory) consistent
with the principles encoded in the fundamental theory. Those low energy
descriptions contain specified parameter values and do generate quantitative
results. But there is no way to establish from first principles how probable
specific ground states of the system are.
B. Mathematically, the fundamental theory does have well defined solu-
tions. There is a fact of the matter as to whether or not a low energy state
constitutes a solution of the fundamental theory and as to how probable that
state is. However, there exists no algorithm that can establish those quanti-
tative results based on calculations that are substantially less complex than
the full description of the entire dynamics of the universe. Therefore, those
calculations will never be carried out by physicists.
C. There is a mathematical scheme that allows for calculating the dynam-
ics of the fundamental theory with reasonable effort. Physicists just have not
found it yet.
Let us look a little closer at those three possibilities.
Alternative A would imply a fundamental break with the way science
has understood the role of mathematics in representing observations. In
particular, it would raise fairly intricate philosophical questions regarding the
conception of a real world and its relation to its mathematical description.
If string theory were indeed viable and A were true, the dynamics of the
world could not even probabilistically be extracted from a formal fundamen-
tal theory. A fundamental theory is here understood to be constituted by
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a formal structure that is defined based on a finite number of mathemat-
ical posits. In this scenario, quantitative treatment and the extraction of
quantitative predictions could be achieved at the level string theory ground-
states. That level of description could not be understood as fundamental,
however, since its consistent conceptualization relies on the representation of
that dynamics in terms of groundstates of a fundamental theory. The corre-
sponding theory could be inferred in its basic characteristics but could not
even in principle be expanded into a conceptual scheme that allowed for a
specification of the fundmanetal dynamics and the extraction of quantitative
predictions.
A situation of that kind would allow for various philosophical interpre-
tations. From a strictly empiricist point of view, it could simply be char-
acterized in terms of limitations to the predictive power of scientific theory
building. The peculiar status of the fundamental theory, which is at the same
time implied by the requirement of having a consistent notion of string theory
groundstates but also fundamentally incapable of being turned into a pre-
dictive scheme, is not reflected by a specific philosophical conceptualization
from such an empiricist perspective.
Viewed from the perspective of scientific realism, to the contrary, alter-
native A raises fundamental new questions regarding the relation between
reality and physical theory. Those questions can once again be addressed in
a number of different ways.
First, one might conclude that there is a part of reality that just cannot be
represented by mathematics. But how, if not based on mathematics, should
one conceive of that part of reality? Given the full dominance of mathe-
matical conceptualization and the radical dissolution of any intuition-based
concepts at the most fundamental levels of physical description, prospects for
developing a convincing conceptual basis for any such understanding seem
very limited. If there is any philosophical message one may consistently draw
from the evolution of physics throughout the 20th century, it hints in exactly
the opposite direction. The century started with the emergence of a general
consensus that human intuitions regarding material objects and their move-
ment through space could be deployed in the context of microphysics in order
to develop a deeper - atomist - understanding of the world. The further the
century progressed, however, the more conspicuous it became that each fur-
ther conceptual step in the development of fundamental physics amounted to
jettisoning core elements of that intuitive perspective. Most ideas on how to
join general relativity and quantum physics seem to imply that, as a last step
in this decay process of intuitive concepts in fundamental physics, space and
time themselves need to be abandoned as fundamental concepts. Having lost
all guidelines that had been based on human intuitions regarding physical
12
objects, mathematics seemed the only remaining basis for adequately ex-
pressing the fundamental physical characteristics of the world. Under those
circumstances, the suggestion to aim at some non-mathematical perspective
on fundamental aspects of the world seems hopelessly backwards-leaning.
In this light, it might look more promising to view alternative A from
a very different perspective. Reality, on that alternative reading, does not
reach beyond what can be grasped based on mathematical formalization but,
quite to the contrary, should be regarded as being confined to those levels of
mathematical description that allow for a quantitative analysis. If so, there
would be no reality corresponding to the level of fundamental principles for
the very reason that those principles don’t imply a fundamental dynamics.
The fundamental theory would assume the peculiar role of providing the
closure of physics that is needed for consistency reasons without representing
the real world.
A perspective that avoids this irritating idea would be to insist on the
principle that there is a direct correspondence between the mathematical
structure of a true physical theory and the real world. Structural reality
could then be attributed to the fundamental level. At that level, however, it
would play out in a way very different from what we expect from a physical
theory. Only at the level of effective theories that allow for a quantitatively
specified dynamics would reality resemble a physical system in the sense we
are accustomed to.
Whatever the philosophical interpretation however, alternative A
amounts to introducing a strictly non-reductionist element into the fabric
of physical theory building: neither at a conceptual nor at an ontological
level would it be possible to reduce the phenomenology describable by our
effective theory to the principles of the fundamental theory.
Alternative B) has the same practical implications as A) but remains
closer to known philosophical territory. Mathematics could remain in place
as a complete representation of the dynamics of the world at the fundamen-
tal level. Reductionism and full consistency could be upheld as general ontic
principles of physics. There would be a set of fundamental equations that
fully specify the state of the world (or, at any rate, the probability of the
state we find ourselves in). Alternative B would just imply that no man-
ageable reduction of complexity regarding the fundamental dynamics of the
world can be achieved that leads to the extraction of parameter values of
effective theories based on any method of approximation. As briefly men-
tioned above, physics knows contexts that are sufficiently chaotic to block
any serious attempt at calculating specific outcomes of the dynamics. Just
13
think of the exact point of landing of a leaf carried away by autumn winds.5
In the given case, one might suspect an even more desperate situation. Given
the lack of free parameters and classical initial conditions, the case we face
might not even allow for choosing simple initial conditions that do allow for
calculations of the fundamental dynamics in a toy model.
This outcome would retain the traditional philosophical take on the role
of mathematics in physical theorizing. But it would not provide a physical
perspective for understanding the fundamental basis of the dynamics we
observe at low energies.
Alternative C) is what physicists are hoping for. Are there any good rea-
sons for assuming the existence of a full-fledged and calculable fundamental
theory of all interactions? One reason for feeling inclined to give a positive
answer to this question may lie in the history of science. The conviction
that physical phenomena can be described by a fully calculable theory even
if they seem to defy any such description at first glance has been the main
driving force in physics ever since the time of Galilei. The striking successes
of physical theory building during four centuries bear witness to the fact that
this conviction has often been vindicated.
Two caveats should be pointed at, however. First, as mentioned above,
not all physical problems are assumed to have a calculable solution. In this
light, the conviction described above is in need of qualification. Scientists
first make up their minds, based on their experience, as to whether or not a
given physical problem can be expected to have a calculable solution. The
physics community’s track record of predicting what would eventually be
calculable obviously is not flawless but seems fairly good on average. In light
of this track record, the physicists’ expectation that a given physical problem
has a calculable answer can become very strong. Such strong expectations
do constitute a main driving force behind their work.
A theory of quantum gravity, or string theory for that matter, at first
glance looks like the kind of theory that should be possible to develop and
eventually to calculate. But, and this brings the second caveat into play,
string theory and the conceptual context within which it is developed is
in a number of ways substantially different from anything physicists have
witnessed up to this point. Therefore, it is far from clear whether prevalent
physical intuitions as to which kinds of questions can be expected to have
a fully calculable theoretical answer are applicable in this case. It seems
difficult to rule out that what seems to be a question that finds a fully
calculable theoretical answer in fact rather resembles the case of the leaf
5Some philosophers of science (see e.g. Cartwright 1983) have drawn far-reaching anti-
reductionist conclusions from this fact.
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carried by autumn winds and just defies calculation. This would bring us
back to alternative B.
One specific difference between string theory and QFT brings alternative
A into play as well. In QFT, the perturbative approach is a tool for extracting
quantitative predictions from the theory. But QFT theory can be formulated
as a full fledged theory (albeit not with the rigor algebraic quantum field
theorists would want). In the case of string theory, the perturbative approach
was all there was in the early days of the theory. No formulation of the theory
was known that did not rely on the perturbative approach. Though it was
expected that the perturbative formulation of the theory should in a cogent
way designate a coherent full theory of strings, it was by no means clear that
such a theory existed.
The conspicuous abundance of string dualities is by many taken to offer a
physical reason to believe in the existence of a calculable fundamental theory.
The conjecture of, let us say, an exact S-duality relation, implies that deeply
non-perturbative large coupling solutions exist for each of the types of string
theory that are related to each other by the duality. This may be read as a
stepping stone towards a general fundamental formulation of string theory .
In the late 1990s there was much confidence among string theorists that
dualities could be developed into a tool for the full calculation of string
theory’s dynamics6. These hopes have turned out to have been premature.
Though dualities have led to many new insights into string theory, it is now
generally acknowledged that further substantially new methods would be
needed in order to fulfil their early promises. Dualities, in this light, may
still be viewed as an indicator that full calculability is a serious possibility
but, at this point, cannot establish that a fully calculable theory exists.
Given the power but also the limitations of duality relations with regard
to finding a fully calculable string theory, how should one understand the
role of dualities in this search on a more general basis?
The next Section will analyse this issue by looking at the various kinds
of dualities that have been discovered so far in the context of string theory.
7 Types of duality in string physics
The extent to which parameters change from a model to its dual varies de-
pending on the type of duality and the context within which it plays out.
The narrowest instantiation of a duality relates parameter values to inverted
values of the same parameter in the same theory. This form of duality is
6A good example of the optimistic spirit at the end of the 20th century is (Greene
1999).
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called self duality. An example in string physics is the S- self duality of Type
IIB superstring theory: type IIB string theory with a string coupling g is
dual to itself with a string coupling 1/g. Another example is the T-duality
of Bosonic string theory: a Bosonic string theory with compactified radius R
is dual to itself with compactified radius l2/R (where l is the string length).
In those cases, observable characteristics of individual objects may appear
as different characteristics in the dual description. For example, the winding
number of a string corresponds to the transversal momentum of the string
in the T-dual description.
Dualities can also relate values of a given parameter to the inverted values
of that parameter in a different theory. We have already encountered the
example of an S-duality that relates Type I superstring theory with a given
string coupling g to SO(32) heterotic string theory with string coupling 1/g,
which in turn has as its T-dual E8xE8 heterotic string theory with an inverted
compactified dimension.
Duality relations can reach out even farther, however, and relate very
different parameters in very different theories to each other. An example
of this kind is AdS/CFT duality. To state one specific examplification of
AdS/CFT, a type IIB superstring theory on AdS5xS5 space is related to a
four dimensional N=4 supersymmetric SU(n) Yang Mills theory (which is a
conformal field theory). The duality relates the curvature of AdS (in units of
the string length) to the ’t Hooft parameter (gYMn)
1/4 in the dual conformal
field theory, where gYM is the coupling constant of the Yang Mills theory.
In other words, a superstring theory is conjectured to be dual to a theory
that is conceptually so different that parameters that characterize the first
theory (such as spacetime curvature) don’t even show up as such in the dual.
The duality relation therefore links values of that parameter to values of an
entirely different parameter in the dual theory.
One characteristic is common to all exemplifications of duality mentioned
so far: each of the parameter values linked by duality relations controls a
classical or low curvature limit of the respective theory. Moving away from a
classical limit in one theory corresponds to moving closer to a classical limit
in its dual. We have discussed this feature already in the S- and T-duality
cases. S-duality relates a coupling constant to its inverse. Moving to higher
– and thereby more quantum – values of the coupling in one theory there-
fore means moving to smaller – and therefore more classical – values in the
dual. Similarly, if one decreases the compactification radius of a theory – and
thereby moves towards a situation where the classical concept of localization
on that dimension becomes less meaningful – one increases the compacti-
fication radius of the T-dual, thereby moving closer to a classical intuitive
understanding of that dimension.
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In the AdS/CFT case, this principle still applies. String theory on AdS
can be related to an effective scenario of localized massive objects moving
through space only if the curvature radius is much larger than the string
length. CFT, on the other hand, has the characteristics of a weakly coupled
theory only if the ’t Hooft parameter is small. And a small ’t Hooft parameter
corresponds to a small curvature radius. Therefore, each of the dual theories
has a classical limit that is controlled by parameters that are linked to each
other by the duality relation. Moving closer to the classical limit in one
theory amounts to moving farther away from the classical limit in the dual.
As we have seen, it is exactly this typical characteristic of duality relations
encountered in the context of string physics that has proved so helpful for
reaching out beyond the perturbative regime. It can allow for calculations of
physical situations that don’t look near classical in terms of one theory but do
look near-classical in its dual. However, for the reasons discussed in Section
5, the described characteristic is not helpful for calculating the fundamental
dynamics of a theory without free parameters. The core obstacle to any
such calculation is the perturbative approach whose reliability is confined to
specific parameter values while the fundamental dynamics must be calculated
before any such parameter values have been fixed.
A further extension of the reach of duality relations might, in principle,
overcome that obstacle: a duality that relates one parameter in the initial
theory that controls a classical limit to a different parameter in the dual
theory that does not lead towards a classical limit at all. Obviously such a
theory would encode the classical limit of its dual theory in a similar way as,
to take one example, a strongly coupled Type I superstring theory encodes
the weak coupling limit of SO(32) heterotic string theory . But a theory of
the described kind would not contain elementary objects which, for specific
parameters values, can be localized and behave in a near classical way. Such
a theory, if it exists, cannot restrict calculability to a near classical limit
because there is no such limit close to which perturbation theory works. So
either the theory is nowhere calculable (which means that there is no regime
where it can make any quantitative predictions) or it must be calculable away
from any classical limit. That is, it had to be calculable without perturbing
around a classical solution. In that case, the theory might offer a promising
framework for a full calculation of the fundamental dynamics.
If such a theory exists, it would be immensely difficult to find. New
theories and models are normally found by first thinking about ways in which
one can consistently move away from a classical limit. Once a new general
theory has been developed, specific realizations of that theory are found by
trying to reproduce empirical data, solving conceptual problems faced by
specific model building, and scanning the options for consistent theory and
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model building within the framework provided by the general theory. To give
an example, quantum field theory provided a general framework within which
specific theories and models, such as the standard model, supersymmetric
models, etc. were then developed.
Dualities are normally discovered by relating two theories to each other
that had already been found along the lines just decribed but had been taken
to be substantially different due to their different classical limits. When
Montonen and Olive (1977) conjectured a duality between a theory with
magnetic solitonic monopoles and one with electric ones, the surprising point
was the duality structure that related weak to strong coupling limits rather
than the point that electric solitons could be built just like magnetic ones.
When S- and T-duality were understood to link the five types of superstring
theory, all five theories had already been spelled out before. The same goes
for the two sides of AdS/CFT duality. There is no well-established method
to construct a new theory based on conjecturing a duality relation between
a known and an unknown theory and constructing the unknown theory just
by applying the duality.
So let us now assume that there is a duality relation that connects a
theory with a classical limit to a theory that does not relate classical limits to
specific values of its parameters. The latter theory cannot be found based on
the traditional heuristics of theory development that are based on thinking in
terms of near classical limits. It will also be very difficult to understand that
the duality exists at all, given that, as pointed out above, duality relations
typically are discovered based on prior knowledge about the two theories
that turn out to be dual. Neither the theory nor the corresponding duality
relation would be likely to be discovered in such a scenario.
One might therefore imagine the following scenario. There exist, in prin-
ciple, two kinds of theories about fundamental physics. There are those
which can provide quantitative calculations of near classical limits based on
perturbation theory. Such theories are adequate for effective theories whose
parameter values do sit close to a classical limit and can be discovered and
developed by thinking about them in terms of a near-classical limit. But
they are not adequate for calculating the dynamics of the final theory (that
is, a theory without free parameters).
Then, there are those theories that are not represented by any parame-
ters that lead towards a classical limit. Therefore they don’t have parameter
values that are preferable for calculations. To the extent those theories are
calculable at all, they may be expected to allow for the calculation of the
entire parameter space and, in this light look like adequate theories for rep-
resenting the dynamics of a fundamental theory without free parameters. But
they are hidden in a conceptual realm that cannot be accessed by following
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near-classical intuitions.
8 The Case of M-Theory
There is one important theory in the context of string physics that may
represent an example of the described scenario: M-theory.
Type IIA string theory with a given string coupling g is conjectured to
be dual to an eleven dimensional theory of membranes and five-branes (M-
theory) with a compactified 11th dimension. E8xE8 heterotic string theory
is conjectured to be dual to an 11-dimensional theory of membranes and five
branes where the 11th dimension is bounded by two nine-branes, each of
them carrying one set of E8 gauge fields. The size of the eleventh dimension
(and the membrane extending through that eleventh dimension) in each case
corresponds to the size of the string coupling. The strong coupling limits of
the string theories in both cases corresponds to a dual limit of M-theory with
an infinitely extended 11th dimension.
The relation between M-theory and the two types of string theory dual
to it is of a peculiar kind. In the low coupling limit, the radius of the 11th
dimension of M-theory goes to zero. The theory dual to M-theory therefore
does have a classical limit of the kind known from other duality relations.
But M-theory with a large 11th dimension does not amount to a new classical
limit. It corresponds to full uncompactified M-theory. M-theory does have a
low energy limit (covering energy scales small compared to the string length)
where 11 dimensional supergravity serves as its effective theory. In this sense,
one can reach a new classical limit that amounts to the classical limit of a
quantum field theory of point-like objects in 11 dimensions. But that limit
is not taken in a genuine M-theory description. 11 dimensional supergravity
knows nothing about two and five branes.
Therefore, the relation between M-theory and Type IIA or E8xE8 het-
erotic string theory is quite different from all other known duality relations.
By lacking a classical limit, it resembles the scenario that was described be-
fore as a scenario that may generate the prospect of a fully calculable theory.
The lack of a perturbative regime for M-theory also constitutes on core
obstacle to formulating M-theory even to the extent this has been achieved
for 10-dimensional superstring theories. The pertrubative ‘entry point’ that
is available in the case of superstring theories is not available in the case of
M-theory. More than 20 years after it was conjectured, it is thus still unclear
how to turn a theory of two- and five-branes in 11 dimensions into a consistent
quantum theory. The concepts of membranes and fivebranes provide a good
heuristics for understanding the nature of the duality relation. In the absence
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of a genuinely ‘membrany’ regime that allows for a perturbative description,
it seems doubtful, however, whether membranes and fivebranes provide a
promising framework for fully formulating and calculating the theory. A lot
of energy has been spent on finding better parameters for representing the
theory. Matrix theory (Banks et al. 1997) has been an influential candidate
but has faced problems of its own. In other words, understanding M-theory
suffers from the fact that the heuristics of theory development cannot be
guided by looking at a classical limit of the theory itself.
9 Conclusion
The present chapter has argued that the lack of free parameters of string
theory plays a crucial role in conceptually connecting two striking features
of string physics: string theory’s final theory claim and its chronic incom-
pleteness. For several reasons, a lack of free parameters may be taken to be a
natural feature of a final and universal theory. But the lack of free parameters
removes the possibility of calculating the theory’s dynamics starting from a
classical limit based on a perturbative expansion. Full access to a theory
without free parameters thus might be expected to require representations
that don’t have their own classical limit. The fact that they cannot be de-
veloped by generalizing away from a classical limit seems to impede the full
formulation of a final theory even once one has found it. The resulting idea
of a fundamental theory whose full formulation is hidden from the physicists’
grasp because its most adequate representation lacks intuitive roots has even
more radical rivals, which amount to questioning the possibility of calculating
the dynamics of the fundamental theory either within the bounds of human
calculational power or as a matter of principle.
It has been suggested by various exponents and observers of contemporary
fundamental physics (see e.g. Smolin 2003, Woit 2003, Hossenfelder 2018)
that the chronic incompleteness of string theory represents a substantial fail-
ure of the research program that is indicative of a strategical problem that
has afflicted fundamental physics in recent decades. This conclusion is based
on the implicit understanding that the challenges faced by scientific theory
building, though obviously differing in their specifics, must always remain of
roughly the same general kind. A substantial deviation from expectations
regarding the general ‘performance’ of scientific theories in a field on that
view must indicate that the way the scientific process plays out in the given
case is flawed.
The present chapter suggests a very different understanding of the current
state of physics. Considering the range and character of the very substantial
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differences that set the current state of fundamental physics apart from any
previous stage in the history of physics, there is little reason to expect that
theory building at the present stage can be judged according to criteria that
seemed adequate in the past. To be sure, it might still happen that a new
conceptual idea will in the near future break the gridlock and, within a
moderate timespan, lead up to a complete and predictively powerful theory
of quantum gravity. Obviously, none of the arguments presented rules out
such a scenario. But, judging the present situation on its own merits rather
than based on the experience one has gathered with respect to earlier theories
that played out in a very different overall context, that may not be the most
plausible scenario.
It may be necessary to substantially correct our understanding of the role
of theory building once physics has entered the stage when it plays out in
the context of a final theory. It might therefore make sense to significantly
downscale expectations on what a theory of quantum gravity can achieve in
the foreseeable future. Understanding the character of the suggested shift
in detail and analysing which achievements can be reasonably aimed at un-
der the new circumstances will then itself become an important element of
physical reasoning.
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